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AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF ARKANSAS GAME
& FISH COMMISSION V. UNITED STATES: EXPANDING
TAKINGS LIABILITY TO WHAT THE GOVERNMENT
DOESN’T DO
JASON KANE*
Disaster marks the interface between an extreme physical
phenomenon and a vulnerable human population. It is of
paramount importance to recognise both of these elements.
Without people there is no disaster.1
In the past fifty years, sea level rise as a result of global climate
change has occurred at a faster rate than adequate protection against
destructive waters.2 As sea levels rise each year, recurrent floodings and
storm surges occur more frequently and with increasingly severe inten-
sity.3 Large storms and hurricanes intensify the force of flooding and cre-
ate unprecedented destruction.4 In the United States, the federal, state,
and local governments are typically responsible for flood mitigation.5
A recent Supreme Court case, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
v. United States (“Game & Fish Commission”), expanded the scope of lia-
bility for government-induced flooding on the federal level.6 The decision
ruled that temporary floodings can be considered a constitutional taking.7
This Note argues that the Game & Fish Commission ruling can be inter-
preted further than on its face. I argue that not only government actions,
but also government omissions that induce flooding can amount to con-
stitutional takings. This interpretation may have far-reaching effects for
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2015; B.A. Philosophy, The College of New
Jersey, 2012. The author would like to thank his family and friends for their support in
law school and the Environmental Law and Policy Review for its hard work.
1 Phil O’Keefe, Ken Westgate & Ben Wisner, Taking the Naturalness Out of Natural
Disasters, 260 NATURE 566, 566 (1976).
2 See SAMUEL D. BRODY, WESLEY E. HIGHFIELD & JUNG EUN KANG, RISING WATERS: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2011).
3 VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., RECURRENT FLOODING STUDY FOR TIDEWATER VIRGINIA 4 (2013),
available at http://ccrm.vims.edu/recurrent_flooding/Recurrent_Flooding_Study_web.pdf.
4 See BRODY, HIGHFIELD & KANG, supra note 2, at 11.
5 See id. at 3.
6 See generally Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
7 Id. at 522.
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property owners and federal, state, and local governments. Insufficient
or improper design or maintenance of flood mitigation infrastructure on
behalf of the government can result in government liability for damage
created by flooding.8
To reach this conclusion:
Part I presents the issue of sea level rise and recurrent flooding in
detail, and how the decision in Game & Fish Commission allows recur-
rent, intermittent flooding to be compensable through a takings claim.
Part II describes the distinguishing features of torts and takings,
and evaluates the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Game & Fish Commission
to identify the action in the case as a taking.
Part III provides a theoretical background using the property and
liability rules of the Calabresi-Melamed framework to discuss how the
Supreme Court’s protection of the property in Game & Fish Commission
provides the framework for a regulatory scheme for government omissions
amounting to takings.
Part IV argues that the regulatory takings framework explained
in Parts II and III amounts to a modified four-factor test in assessing a
takings claim when the government may be liable for insufficient or im-
proper design or maintenance of flood mitigation infrastructure.
Part V applies the four-factor test of Part IV to three scenarios:
1. The Fairfax flooding issues in Livingston v. Virginia
Department of Transportation,
2. The post-Katrina flooding in New Orleans, liti-
gated in In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated
Litigation, and,
3. Flooding that would result if dunes were not con-
structed in New Jersey and a Sandy-like storm hit,
as shown through Borough of Harvey Cedars v.
Karan.
8 BRODY, HIGHFIELD & KANG, supra note 2, at 3. Some of these ideas currently have legal
precedent: in Virginia, Livingston v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 726 S.E. 2d 264 (2012) (land-
owners who lose property to flooding resulting from government failure to maintain or
properly design or operate mitigation structures may have a valid claim for compensation
under the takings clause), and Arkansas, Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W. 2d (1990)
(requiring the government to pay an aggrieved landowner when the government failed to
properly design or maintain a public work). See also DANIEL DOTY & CHRIS OLCOTT, VA.
COASTAL POLICY CLINIC, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT’S 2012 LIVINGSTON CASE: LOCALITIES
AND THE RISK OF “TAKINGS” CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN FLOOD CONTROL
STRUCTURES 3 (2013), available at http://law.wm.edu/academics/programs/jd/electives/clinics
/vacoastal/docs/livingstoncase.pdf.
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The Conclusion will review the Note and expand on the importance of
Game & Fish Commission to property owners in the midst of further,
inevitable sea level rise.
I. THE FACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND RECURRENT FLOODING ARE
RELEVANT WITH REGARD TO THE GOVERNMENT-INDUCED
FLOODING OF ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION
The sea level has been rising worldwide for over fifty years.9 Since
the early 1990s, local sea levels have been rising at a rate substantially
greater than in past decades.10 The future extent of sea level rise is pro-
jected to rise anywhere from “low” projections of 1.5 feet, to the “highest”
projections of 7.5 feet by 2100.11 Some projections predict that a 1.5 foot
rise is expected as soon as 2033.12 It is estimated that a four foot sea level
rise would affect 316 American municipalities, which would displace over
3.6 million citizens.13
A main effect of sea level rise is recurrent flooding.14 Recurrent
flooding is “flooding that happens repeatedly in the same areas, typically
leading to economic losses.”15 Sea level rise, combined with high tides and
storm surges, increases the frequency and intensity of recurrent flooding in
tidal areas.16 Impacts from recurrent flooding “range from temporary road
closures to the loss of homes, property and life. . . . [costing] millions to
hundreds of millions of dollars per storm.”17 The destructive impact from
floods in the United States each year is greater than that of any other type
of natural disaster.18
9 JOHN BOON, HARRY WANG & JIAN SHEN, VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., PLANNING FOR SEA
LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING 1 (2008), available at http://www.vims.edu/research
/units/programs/icccr/_docs/coastal_sea_level.pdf.
10 Id. (reporting 3.1 mm per year from 1993 to 2003, as opposed to 1.8 mm per year from
1961 to 2003).
11 VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., supra note 3, at 112.
12 Id.
13 Wendy Koch, Study: Sea-Level Rise Threatens 1,400 U.S. Cities, USA TODAY, July 29,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/29/sea-level-rise-cities-towns
/2593727/, archived at http://perma.cc/WL28-UVZR.
14 VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., supra note 3, at 4.
15 Id. at 1.
16 Id. at 4.
17 Id. See also BRODY, HIGHFIELD & KANG, supra note 2, at 2 (“[P]rivate property, house-
holds, businesses, and the overall economic well-being of coastal communities have become
increasingly vulnerable to the risks of repetitive flooding events.”).
18 BRODY, HIGHFIELD & KANG, supra note 2, at 11.
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In the United States, the federal, state, and local governments are
typically responsible for flood mitigation.19 The federal government can pro-
vide insurance, “disaster relief or large dams and levees.”20 Local govern-
ments are best equipped to develop “county and citywide land use plans,
development and construction codes, zoning and subdivision ordinances,
technical assistance, community-based outreach, and other locally based
non-structural programs.”21
Government-created flood mitigation infrastructure is frequently
successful.22 However, inadequate construction or maintenance of flood
mitigation infrastructure designed to prevent damage and destruction
from natural floods has led to unprecedented destruction, devastation,
and death.23
The Supreme Court case at the heart of this Note has great poten-
tial to bring a change in treatment for residents harmed by temporary,
intermittent, or recurring flooding caused by government entities. In
Game & Fish Commission, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(“Army Corps”) constructed and maintained a dam on the Black River in
northeast Arkansas.24 The Army Corps originally followed a Water Control
Manual (“Manual”) to determine when and how much water would be
released from behind the dam.25 In 1993, the Army Corps deviated from
the Manual’s plan and released water at a slower rate, at the request of
downstream farmers, to lengthen the harvest season.26 The deviation from
the Manual occurred annually: there would be a slow release of water
each fall and a longer, larger rate of release in the spring and summer.27
The annual releases impacted the David Donaldson Black River
Wildlife Management Area (“Management Area”), owned by the Arkan-
sas Game & Fish Commission (“Commission”).28 The Management Area
consists of 23,000 acres, forested with multiple types of hardwood trees,
19 See id. at 3.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 ASS'N OF STATE FLOOD PLAIN MANAGERS, Mitigation Success Stories in the United States
iii (2012), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/MSS_IV_Final.pdf.
23 JON A. KUSLER, ASS'N OF STATE FLOOD PLAIN MANAGERS, A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT PUBLIC
LIABILITY FOR FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION 4 (2009), available at http://www.floods.org
/PDF/Mitigation/ASFPM_Comparative_look_at_pub_liability_for_flood_haz_mitigation
_09.pdf.
24 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 515–16.
25 Id. at 516.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 515–16.
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and supports a variety of wildlife habitats.29 It is used as a hunting pre-
serve, a timber source, and a venue for recreation.30 Between 1993 and
1999, the Commission alleged that the Corps’ releases of water “resulted
in the destruction of timber in the Management Area and a substantial
change in the character of the terrain, which necessitated costly reclama-
tion measures.”31
The United States Court of Federal Claims ruled for the Commis-
sion, ruling that the increased annual flooding resulted in an appropria-
tion of the Commission’s property and significantly altered the character
of the area.32 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed the decision, ruling that a taking by government-induced
flooding must be “permanent or inevitably recurring.”33 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.34
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Game & Fish Commission reversed
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and overruled the traditional
notion of “government actions that cause repeated floodings must be
permanent or inevitably recurring to constitute a taking of property.”35
The Supreme Court emphasized that takings cases are fact and situation
specific.36 The Court ruled that: “government-induced flooding of limited
duration may be compensable. No decision of this Court authorizes a blan-
ket temporary-flooding exception to our Takings Clause jurisprudence,
and we decline to create such an exception in this case.”37
As this Note will describe, the Court characterized the flooding
liability of the property in question as a taking—as opposed to a tort, and
determined that it reflected an entitlement protected by a liability rule—as
opposed to a property rule.
Because of this, I will argue that this ruling opened the floodgates
to enable the courts to require the government to compensate victims of
temporary government-induced floodings. The Supreme Court left open the
question of what will constitute a taking by government-induced flooding.
29 Id. at 515.
30 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 516.
31 Id. at 516–17.
32 Id. at 517.
33 Id.; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed Cir. 2011).
34 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518.
35 Id. at 518, 523. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (ruling that “a permanent physical occupation [of property] authorized by govern-
ment is a taking”).
36 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
37 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519.
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Thus, this Note argues that Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
holds that government entities can be liable for takings caused by recur-
rent flooding induced by both their actions and omissions of providing
adequate measures and protection from recurrent flooding.
My argument is supported by the legal and theoretical back-
ground of the Supreme Court ruling. Legally, a regulatory framework is
necessary to create institutional mechanisms. To develop a regulatory
framework for government-induced temporary floodings, the floodings
must be characterized as a taking rather than a tort.
Additionally, within a regulatory framework, the entity damaged
by the flooding must be protected by a liability rule, as opposed to a prop-
erty rule. While a property rule encourages settlement between parties,
it discourages government intervention and regulation. The regulatory
framework desired requires flooded property to be protected through a
liability rule. This is the only way to assure the possibility of compensa-
tion for property owners harmed by government flooding. This will help
prevent the more powerful entity (the government) from avoiding liabil-
ity for its actions.
Although the Supreme Court was correct in ruling that the prop-
erty damage in Game & Fish Commission should be characterized as a
taking, it could have used a clearer and more persuasive test to reflect
that conclusion and to be used in future cases.
This Note merely reflects the tip of the iceberg on the possibilities
opened by the Supreme Court’s ruling, how it is consistent with other
legal theories, and how it is practical in the world. The interpretation of
the Game & Fish Commission ruling has consequences extremely benefi-
cial for the public, as coastal jurisdictions will be encouraged to protect
citizens from intermittent recurrent floodings and provide better mainte-
nance in flood mitigation projects. Jurisdictions will be incentivized to
provide protection to citizens in order not to litigate or settle with count-
less individual property owners who sue for a temporary taking for recur-
rent flooding. Jurisdictions can save money by protecting their citizens
from harm rather than paying for inevitable, severe, and widespread dam-
age from natural disasters and sea level rise.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE TORT-TAKING DISTINCTION AND ITS
APPLICATION IN ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION
Only takings—and not torts—can permit a property owner whose
property is damaged through recurrent flooding to be compensated by the
government.
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The distinction of takings and torts has been scrutinized throughout
American jurisprudence.38 Takings are described in the “Takings Clause”
of the United States Constitution, which states: “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”39 A tort, broadly, is
“conduct that amounts to a legal wrong and that causes harm for which
courts will impose civil liability.”40 While the right to receive compensa-
tion from a taking is constitutional, tort compensation is governed by the
common law and by statute.41
A constitutional taking is derived from the larger concept of eminent
domain.42 Eminent domain is an inherent sovereign right of the govern-
ment43 that “does not prohibit the government from taking its citizens’
property; rather, it merely prohibits the government from taking prop-
erty without paying just compensation. It is designed to secure compen-
sation, not to limit governmental interference with property rights.”44
Although many situations can theoretically be remedied through
either a tort or a takings analysis, there are factors that distinguish when
takings, and sometimes not torts, allow the flooding victim to recover.
Torts, or injuries that are only “in [their] nature indirect and consequen-
tial,” cannot be takings.45 Takings, on the other hand, are not merely
property injuries; rather, takings must “constitute an actual, permanent
invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of . . . the property.”46
The Supreme Court in Game & Fish Commission has “recog-
nized . . . that no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case,
whether a given government interference with property is a taking.”47
The justices analyzed a line of dated cases to conclude that “government-
induced flooding can constitute a taking.”48 Although the dated cases
may be mandatory authority, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
38 See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Hansen
v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 79–80 (2005); 9 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G34.03[1] (3d ed. 1980 & Supp. 2002).
39 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
40 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2d ed. 2013).
41 Id.
42 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2013).
43 Id.
44 Id. (citation omitted).
45 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924).
46 Id. at 149. In the context of flooding, see 2A-6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01, 13.
47 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012).
48 Id. (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 116 (1872), United States v. Cress, 243
U.S. 316, 328 (1917)). The Supreme Court did note Ridge Line towards the end of its
opinion as dicta. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522.
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formulated a test to determine whether a case can be analyzed under a
takings analysis in Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States.49 Ridge Line, as per-
suasive authority, having arisen from the Federal Court of Claims, and
as a significantly more recent decision then the cases cited by the Supreme
Court, should be used to affirm the Court’s determination that the flood-
ing in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission is a taking.50
Ridge Line involved property in a large West Virginia shopping
center and mixed-use area, downhill from a United States Postal Service
facility (the “Postal Service facility”).51 Storm water runoff from the shop-
ping center and the Postal Service facility drained into an area between
the two properties known as South Hollow, which Ridge Line partially
owned.52 The completion of the Postal Service facility increased storm
water runoff into South Hollow significantly, resulting in downstream
flooding.53 “Ridge Line built a storm water detention pond in South
Hollow,” to alleviate the flooding; however, the Postal Service facility
failed to contribute to the project.54 Ridge Line sued the government on
the basis of a taking, claiming that the increased flooding from the Postal
Service facility required Ridge Line to incur additional costs presently
and in the future to maintain the flooding.55 The trial court ruled in favor
of the government,56 and Ridge Line appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.57
Ridge Line uses a two-prong test to distinguish a taking.58 The
first prong considers whether the effects of the government conduct was
predictable (“foreseeability prong”),59 and the second prong is whether the
49 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See Magdalene
Carter, Note, Flooding the Possibility of Recovery Under a Temporary Takings Analysis:
The Drowning Effects of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 23 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 225 (2012); Jennifer Helgeson-Albertson, Note, Setting Moden Straight:
Hansen v. United States and the Model Application of the Tort-Taking Distinction Test,
11 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 105, 109–10 (2006/2007).
50 Because of this reasoning, I will use the Ridge Line test as a foundation for the test I
later compose to determine the compensability of a temporary flooding. See infra Part IV.
51 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1350–51.
52 Id. at 1351.
53 Id. The Postal Service facility did construct drainage structures and a dam to control
water, but was ineffective. Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1352. See also Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, No. 98-CV-929
(Fed. Cl. 2002).
57 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1352.
58 Id. at 1355.
59 Id. at 1355. See Carter, supra note 49, at 225.
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conduct was sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy (“substanti-
ality prong”).60
To satisfy the foreseeability prong, one of two requirements must
be met.61 The government must intend to “invade a protected property
interest,”62 or the invasion of property must be the “direct, natural, or
probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or conse-
quential injury inflicted by the action.”63
The plaintiffs in Ridge Line did “not allege that the government
intentionally appropriated its property,” and instead, needed to prove
that the flooding was the “direct, natural, or probable result” of the erection
of the Postal Service facility.64 The court noted that “incidental or conse-
quential injury” would involve “improvident conduct on the part of the
government in managing its property.”65 Rather, the flooding must be a
“predicable result of government action.”66
The substantiality prong of the Ridge Line test considers the “nature
and magnitude” of the government conduct.67 The conduct must “appropri-
ate a benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner, or at
least preempt the owner’s right to enjoy his property for an extended
period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its value.”68
With regard to flooding, the court noted that, “isolated invasions,
such as one or two floodings . . ., do not make a taking . . ., but repeated
invasions of the same type have often been held to result in an involun-
tary servitude.”69
The court cited Eyherabide v. United States to support its claim.70
In Eyherabide, the United States Navy’s disregard of formal boundaries
60 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1357.
61 Id. at 1355.
62 Id.
63 Id. (quoting Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709 (Ct. Cl.
1955)).
64 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356.
65 Id.
66 Id. (citation omitted). Compare Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 233–34
(1948) (ruling that there was a taking after “a succession of events . . . all occurr[ing] in
their natural order” resulted in flooding of the plaintiff’s land) with John Horstmann Co.
v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921) (ruling that the movement of the percolating
underground waters was hidden, and did not result in a taking).
67 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356.
68 Id. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 428, 431–32 (1923).
69 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1357 (quoting Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 569
(Ct. Cl. 1965)) (emphasis added).
70 See Eyherabide, 345 F.2d at 569.
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on a gunnery range created a takings issue.71 The owners of the ranch
outside of the boundaries were unable to find caretakers to the ranch,
owing to warning signs regarding the dangers of the gunnery range,72
airplane droppings near the ranch house, bullet casings on the property,
bullet holes in the house and barn, and airplane landings south of the
ranch yet outside of the gunnery boundary.73 Later, the ranch would be
found to be destroyed by explosives, likely by naval ordinance.74 The
court concluded that the accumulation of these activities accounted for
a taking by “the near-total deprivation” of benefit of the land.75
Traditionally, in the context of flooding, courts have ruled that con-
stitutional takings are permanent invasions of property by inundation.76
The alleged government-induced flooding in Game & Fish Commission was
a result of intermittent releases of water behind the dam.77 There is binding
case law that the Game & Fish Commission Court relied on to expand
the designation of takings when the flooding is intermittent yet inevita-
bly recurring, which supports both prongs of the Ridge Line test.78 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Cress stated that, “[t]here is no differ-
ence of kind, but only of degree, between a permanent condition . . . and a
permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows.”79
Similarly, in United States v. Dickinson, the Court found that even an area
of land that the plaintiff reclaimed, that was formerly permanently flooded
by intermittent overflows, still constituted a taking.80 In applying the
facts of the Eyherabide case as an analogy to flooding, any substantiation
71 Id. at 566–69.
72 The signs warned travelers about old boundaries of the gunnery range. They were main-
tained for the new boundary of the gunnery range, and not the plaintiff’s ranch. However,
the reasonable reaction would be to regard them as approaching the plaintiff’s property.
Id. at 568.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 568–69.
75 Id. at 567.
76 See Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (ruling that a taking
occurs “when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical
occupation.”); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (A per-
manent use restriction constituted a taking.).
77 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 516 (2012).
78 Id. at 519–21. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917); Helgeson-Albertson,
supra note 49, at 105. See also Barnes, 538 F.2d at 870.
79 Cress, 243 U.S. at 328.
80 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 746–47, 751 (1947).
2015] AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE 437
making an area of land unusable or depriving reasonable benefit to the
land constitutes a taking.81
Game & Fish Commission would be ruled the same way through
the lens of the Ridge Line test.82 The Commission in Game & Fish Com-
mission satisfied the foreseeability prong, as the Commission alerted the
Army Corps on multiple occasions to the detrimental effects of the deviation
from the plan.83 The government had no reason not to foresee at least the
continued consequences of its actions.
As for the substantiality prong, the Supreme Court in Game &
Fish Commission recognized that the intermittent flooding occurred over
a period of six years.84 While the flooding may not have necessarily
invaded all effected parts of the Management Area, the Supreme Court
identified that the land was substantially changed in character, includ-
ing the destruction of trees, which led “to the invasion of undesirable
plant species, making natural regeneration of the forests improbable in
the absence of reclamation efforts.”85 In applying the Eyherabide stan-
dard, the flooding deprived the land of its benefit to its owners.86 This
establishes the grounds for a takings claim.
Additionally, when the federal government is alleged to have
created the government-induced flooding, the government is immune to
tort liability by federal statute: “No liability of any kind shall attach to
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place.”87 However, this statute does not apply to the Fifth
Amendment takings clause, as the Constitution supersedes federal
statutes.88 Therefore, since there are federal statutes that provide sovereign
immunity to the government in tort,89 the federal government can compen-
sate property damage it causes through flooding as a constitutional taking.
81 This is further explored in Part V.
82 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522–23.
83 Id. at 517, 522–23.
84 Id. at 516.
85 Id. at 517, 522–23.
86 See Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
87 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2014). This will be further explained in Part V.
88 “It has long been established that when Congress exercises powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, as it did when enacting § 702c, ‘it must proceed subject to the limitations
imposed by th[e] Fifth Amendment, and can take [property] only on payment of just
compensation.’ ” Turner v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 832, 834 (1989) (quoting in part
Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893)).
89 Turner, 17 Cl. Ct. at 834–35.
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This guides us with a legal framework toward the goal of a regulatory
framework for property owner recovery for flooding damage caused by
the government.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CALABRESI-MELAMED
TAXONOMY
To create a functional regulatory framework for takings cases, the
property owner must be entitled in these cases to avoid the government
prevailing by other means. A theoretical framework of remedies must be
considered.
To analyze the issues of remedies that fall in property and tort
law, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed constructed a theoretical
framework using entitlements.90 An “entitlement” is whom an institution
chooses to entitle in a conflict.91 Calabresi and Melamed’s rationale is
that the choice of entitlements must be enforced by society in order to
avoid allowing the larger or more powerful entity to ultimately prevail
in a conflict, thereby preserving justice.92
Calabresi and Melamed offer three reasons why an institution
would choose to entitle one entity over the other: economic efficiency,
distributional preferences, and other justice considerations.93
To entitle an entity because it is economically efficient means to:
Choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that allo-
cation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
that a further change would not so improve the condition
of those who gained by it that they could compensate those
who lost from it and still be better off than before.94
This analysis takes social costs and benefits into consideration.95 Through
economic efficiency, the cost should be given to the entity that is best
90 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
91 Id. at 1090.
92 Id. at 1090–91.
93 Id. at 1093.
94 Id. at 1093–94. A true economic efficiency analysis would involve no transaction costs.
Id. at 1096.
95 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1096–97.
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located to make a cost-benefit analysis of the risks involved in the action,
and also who can avoid the risk with the least cost.96 In a takings case,
the cost should be placed on the larger party with deeper pockets—the
government. The government will typically be able to avoid the risk by
adding preventative measures to not foreseeably flood other properties.97
Calabresi and Melamed describe two different distributional goals
that could affect which entity in a conflict receives entitlement: the distribu-
tion of wealth and the distribution of specific goods.98 Distribution of wealth
preferences involve the tendency of a society to entitle entities, while
favoring equality or efficiency.99 Similarly, a distribution of merit goods
preference provides an entitlement to an entity without an endowment
the society views as essential.100 By deeming an entitlement as essential,
the society makes the entitlement inalienable.101
In government-induced flooding cases, a distribution of wealth
favors protecting property owners as opposed to the government, as it
would be an inefficient system for property owners to provide self-remedies
for recurring or permanent government damage. The government could
inevitably flood with no consequences otherwise. The parties are made
more equal when the government compensates the property owner it
harms. With regards to a distribution of merit goods, society views the
right to exclude as essential.102 By protecting the property owners, their
inalienable right to exclude unwanted flooding becomes paramount as
opposed to other government interests.
Lastly, an entity can be entitled to protection based on consider-
ations involving justice.103 Calabresi and Melamed use a hypothetical
scenario to explain this idea:
96 Id. at 1097. Additionally, this theoretical analysis assumes no transaction costs. Id. at
1094–95. In practice, transaction costs would be considered. However, Calabresi and
Melamed suggest that assessing an issue through this framework without transaction
costs is valuable to strictly view economic efficiency through the lens of a distribution of
wealth. Id. at 1096.
97 This is acknowledged in my four-factor test considering takings, see infra Part IV.
98 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1098. Calabresi and Melamed also refer to the
distribution of merit goods as “specific goods.” Id.
99 Id. at 1098.
100 Id. at 1100.
101 Id.
102 See Thomas W. Merrill, Essay: Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
730 (1998).
103 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1102.
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Taney likes noise; Marshall likes silence. They are, let us
assume, inevitably neighbors. Let us also assume there are
no transaction costs which may impede negotiations be-
tween them. Let us assume finally that we do not know
Taney’s and Marshall’s wealth or, indeed, anything else
about them. Under these circumstances we know that
Pareto optimality—economic efficiency—will be reached
whether we choose an entitlement to make noise or to have
silence. We also are indifferent, from a general wealth dis-
tribution point of view, as to what the initial entitlement is
because we do not know whether it will lead to greater
equality or inequality. This leaves us with only two reasons
on which to base our choice of entitlement. The first is the
relative worthiness of silence lovers and noise lovers. The
second is the consistency of the choice, or its apparent
consistency, with other entitlements in the society.104
The authors describe the one appeal to justice considering efficiency and
distributional notions.105 However, Calabresi and Melamed dismiss this
option as the effects of the entitlement would be too general and diverse
to analyze external effects, and thus give no true guidance to justice.106
A second reason for entitling consistent choices is based on other
entitlements in the society.107 This is appealing as the choice provides
predictability and encourages obedience in a society.108 However, this
reason falls into the same dilemma as the first choice: the consistency
choice requires an analysis of efficiency and distributional notions.109
To show these concepts through Calabresi and Melamed’s hypo-
thetical, we can choose to entitle Taney, the noise-lover, over Marshall, the
silence-lover, because we want to improve the wealth of Taney or provide
Taney with the essential right society considers creating noise.110 By
entitling Taney on the basis of efficiency and distributional goals, within
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1103.
106 See id. at 1104.
107 See id. at 1103.
108 See id.
109 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1103. It is not clear what the authors actually
meant by “other justice reasons.” Id. at 1105; SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 281 (2d ed.
2013). However, they are relevant and worth exploring in this topic within a future paper.
110 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1102–03.
2015] AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE 441
the context of Taney and Marshall, we cannot sufficiently analyze effects
on other people and the rest of society.111 If the second line of reasoning
of consistency is followed, the same issues are still encountered,112 and
there is still a lack of confidence in serving justice, compared to goals of
efficiency and distribution.113
Once the institution chooses which entity to entitle, the institution
must determine how to protect the entitlement.114 The two entitlement
protections relevant to recurrent flooding are entitlements protected by
property rules and entitlements protected by liability rules.115 Each of these
rules creates a different framework to remedy situations of conflict.116
An entitlement protected by a property rule “gives rise to the least
amount of state intervention.”117 Rather, the sale of this form of entitle-
ment is negotiated through a voluntary transaction through the collec-
tive action of the conflicted parties.118 Typically, the transaction is based
on the market value of the activity in question.119 Conversely, the sale of
an entitlement protected by a liability rule is determined by an objective,
collective valuation set by the institution.120
It can be argued that if there is less institutional interference by
entitling an entity through a voluntary negotiation, society should not
use more costly liability rules.121 However, entitlements protected by
property rules are only efficient when transaction costs are low, and this
is not always plausible.122 Additionally, property rules are prone to hold-
outs and freeloaders, depending on the non-entitled party’s willingness
to pay for its violations.123
In a government flooding takings case, the transactional costs
may be quite high. The government likely will have complex and detailed
procedures with high costs to manage. Resolution of the issues may take
111 See id. at 1103.
112 Id. at 1104.
113 See id. at 1105.
114 Id. at 1105–06.
115 Id.
116 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1105–06.
117 Id. at 1092.
118 Id. at 1107.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1096.
123 Id. at 1107.
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years. The government can freeload from these long and costly proce-
dures and may be able to wait until the property owner must give up out
of costs or frustration.
Conversely, liability rules are preferable when the “market valua-
tion of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is either unavail-
able or too expensive compared to a collective valuation.”124 A regulatory
scheme through collective valuation can be formed when negotiating
between individual parties is eliminated and the scheme is set by the
institution.125 However, as with considering which entity to entitle, jus-
tice may not be satisfied by moving from a property rule to a liability
rule, considering efficiency and distributional goals.126
In the context of Game & Fish Commission, the Supreme Court
chose to entitle the Management Area owned by the Commission.127 From
an economic efficiency perspective, placing the cost on the Army Corps
logically follows from the Calabresi-Melamed perspective, as it is the
entity that is best situated to make a cost-benefit analysis of the risks of
deviating from the plan, and can avoid the risk at least cost.128 It would
be extremely costly for the Commission to protect the Management Area
from the flooding altering the character of the land.129 To be protected
from the flooding, the Commission would have to add large enough and
heavily vegetated buffer zones,130 or a system of dams and dikes, or some
other erosion-preventing protective technique. The Army Corps, conversely,
can evaluate the risk of releasing the water according to the plan.131
Within the context of distributional goals, the Army Corps, as a fed-
eral entity, had vastly more wealth and resources than the Commission,
a state entity. Calabresi and Melamed would suggest that this society
prefers to entitle the less wealthy party to move towards a more egalitar-
ian society.132 Lastly, the court sought to provide entitlement through
consistency—when a repeated, temporary flooding affects property in
124 Id. at 1110.
125 See id. at 1106–10.
126 See id. at 1110.
127 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012).
128 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1094.
129 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. At 517.
130 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STORM WATER MANAGEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES:
SEDIMENT AND EROSION CONTROL 3–22 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/region6
/6en/w/sw/sediment.pdf.
131 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 516.
132 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1098–99.
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such a designated manner, the source of the flooding, the government,
will be responsible for providing compensation for the invasion of prop-
erty by a taking.133
The Supreme Court chose to protect the Management Area’s en-
titlement with a liability right. Like Taney, the noise-lover, and Marshall,
the silence-lover, in Calabresi and Melamed’s hypothetical situation, the
actions of the Army Corps harmed the Commission.134 However, unlike
Taney and Marshall, the Commission and the Army Corps were not in
a position to negotiate how the irregular floodings that diverged from the
plan affected the Management Area.135 Providing an entitlement to the
Management Area through a property rule would not be efficient, as the
transaction costs of negotiations between the Commission and the Army
Corps would be high and ineffective, shown by the Commission’s repeated
and failed complaints to the Army Corps.136
Additionally, the Army Corps must maintain the dam.137 The
Supreme Court could have enjoined the Army Corps to release the water
at regular intervals as the plan prescribes.138 This would be a property
rule remedy,139 as it would push the negotiating back to the parties,
forcing the Army Corps, as well as the farmer who requested the devia-
tion from the plan, to bargain with the Commission to lift the injunction.
By allowing the Army Corps to compensate the Commission by designat-
ing a taking, the Corps can assess the risk of other possible takings they
would be responsible for at other points on the river and determine what
action to take—removing the Commission from any bargaining.
The Melamed-Calabresi taxonomy shows how a regulatory scheme
must use a liability rule protecting the property owner in the context of
temporary floodings caused by the government.
IV. REFORMULATION OF THE TAKINGS RULE FOR ALLEGED
GOVERNMENT-CAUSED TEMPORARY FLOODING CLAIMS
This Note has explained the legal and theoretical background used
by the Supreme Court to construct a regulatory framework for temporary
133 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522.
134 See id. at 516–17.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1116.
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floodings induced by the government. I will argue that the government
is liable for some of their omissions, and not only actions, that would pre-
vent damage from temporary flooding. This creates a new set of factors
for determining a taking.
Omissions add a new dimension to the criteria for a taking, as
discussed earlier in this paper.140 This restricts takings in such a way
that the factors constituting a taking are141:
1. Causation—Did a government action or omission
cause the flooding?
2. Foreseeability—Could the government reasonably
foresee repeated flooding?142
3. Responsibility—Did the government have a respon-
sibility to act and prevent the flooding? and
4. Substantiality—Was the flooding substantial and
did it invade rights of the landowner?
Each of these criteria will be discussed and reviewed, in brief.
A. Causation
The language of Game & Fish Commission leaves open the possibil-
ity that the government can be liable for omissions that induce floodings.143
However, the largest issue that opposes the expansion of Game & Fish
Commission to omissions is causation.144 It could be asked: how can the
government be responsible for inaction, or something it did not do? Addi-
tionally, courts may not see government omissions as a sufficient causal
140 See supra Part II.
141 The Supreme Court in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission noted causation, foresee-
ability, and substantiality as factors of temporary takings by government induced floodings;
however, the Court did not add clear detail as to what these factors entail. See Ark. Game
& Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. At 523.
142 See generally Jan G. Laitos & Teresa Helms Abel, The Role of Causation When Determin-
ing the Proper Defendant in a Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. BILL OF RTS. J. 1181, 1233–41
(2012) (providing a framework in which foreseeability is a factor of causation). I disagree
with this as there can be scenarios where the government is the cause of flooding, yet the
flooding was unforeseeable, and should be considered separately. See infra Parts V.A–B.
143 The decision mentions government action but does not provide any dicta concerning
government inaction. See generally Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 513–22.
144 See Laitos & Abel, supra note 142, at 1241.
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link for takings cases.145 Yet, some legal theorists believe that an act/
omission distinction is arbitrary, since both kinds of conduct can result
in the same liability and result.146
There are two possibilities to this causation factor: first, did the
government “act,” and, second, was the government a proximate cause
of the flooding?
1. Action
To determine whether the government acts, it is important to
recognize an act/omission distinction, as it is important to articulate a
theory of freedom.147 Thus, one solution to avoid this issue is to evaluate
an omission through a free will theory.148 Free will allows omissions to
be interpreted as a choice between alternatives—acting on one alterna-
tive and actively not choosing another determined by characteristics of
the situation.149 If the government considers an action to deter flooding,
yet chooses an alternative path which creates flooding, the action factor
of the causation requirement is satisfied.
2. Proximate Cause
A broad, overarching explanation of proximate cause is that
proximate cause “depends essentially on whether the policy of the law
will extend the responsibility . . . to the consequences which have in fact
occurred.”150 More clearly, the owner must show that the property was
taken because of the government’s action.151 The case law in this area
greatly varies and is often very unclear.152 Additionally, it may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to sort out various forces that contribute to causing
145 See id. at 1182.
146 George P. Fletcher, Truth in Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 761 (1998).
147 See id. at 760.
148 See generally Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill,
archived at http://perma.cc/J7U6-EEM3.
149 See id. at 3.1.
150 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 412 (2013).
151 Laitos & Abel, supra note 142, at 1195.
152 See id. See also Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 322–23 (2007) (describing multiple iterations of proximate cause).
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the flooding: nature, market, third parties, the plaintiff’s contributory
actions, etc.153
B. Foreseeability154
A logical chain supports foreseeability in recurrent flooding.
Recurrent flooding is, by definition, foreseeable.155 The case is sufficiently
stronger regarding foreseeability if the governmental body is aware of
the repeated floodings. This can be accomplished through the injured
property owner notifying the government body of the recurrent flooding,
or if the government body explicitly recognizes the area as prone to
recurrent floodings.
C. Responsibility156
Responsibilities of the government are enumerated and restricted
by the Constitution.157 Omissions, interpreted through the act/omission
distinction within the context of the Constitution, can be interpreted as a
failure to act completely when one has the responsibility to act.158 As men-
tioned, the Takings Clause of the Constitution provides a responsibility
for the government, stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”159 Additionally, the Constitution
ensures a safeguard from the taking of property without due process.160
153 Laitos & Abel, supra note 142, at 1195, 1999 (noting that judicial decisions turn to
policy considerations when sifting through multiple actors in causation issues).
154 For previous discussion of legal factors involved in foreseeability, see supra text ac-
companying notes 62–67.
155 See VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., supra note 3, at vi (“flooding that happens repeatedly
in the same areas, typically leading to economic losses.”).
156 “Responsibility” is defined as responsibility in a moral sense, as a duty that deserves
blame or praise, and as opposed to causal responsibility. See Andrew Eshleman, Moral
Responsibility, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/, archived at http://
perma.cc/MA2P-686D.
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
158 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (holding
that failure to protect minor from violent father does not violate minor’s rights under Due
Process Clause).
159 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
160 U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
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D. Substantiality161
The Supreme Court expressed that a taking can be found in a
temporary flooding situation where the damage is substantial.162 The
Supreme Court, however, did not rule on whether there was substantial
flooding in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, and thus the Court did
not describe a substantial flooding for a successful takings claim.163
The test that should be used in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
to determine a substantial flooding amounting to a government taking
can be found in Ridge Line.164 While even that court was not overtly de-
scriptive in determining “whether the government’s interference with
any property rights of Ridge Line was substantial and frequent enough
to rise to the level of a taking,”165 the case is precedential for the Court
of Federal Claims, and should be followed as a matter of stare decisis.
One way to determine substantiality can be drawn from
Eyherabide v. United States, which the court in Ridge Line cited in its
opinion.166 This Court of Claims case involved the government restricting
beneficial use of a property by deterring access through the use of warn-
ing signs approaching the property, and through creating an unsafe
condition by way of the airplane droppings, gunshots, and explosives on
and around the property in question.167 By analogy, government-induced
flooding, or flooding by government omission, can also deter access to
property or create an unsafe condition—both depriving a landowner of
beneficial use of property.168
Additionally, another line of cases provides guidance when the
land is flooded. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the Supreme Court ruled
that, “where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water . . . so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a tak-
ing.”169 In United States v. Cress, permanent destruction of the land could
be established by intermittent floodings.170 In Game & Fish Commission,
161 The basis for this factor comes from the Ridge Line test, see supra accompanying text
at notes 68–83.
162 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012).
163 See id. at 521–22.
164 See Ridge Line Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
165 Id.
166 Eyherabide v. United States is discussed in detail, supra accompanying text at notes
69–81.
167 See Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 568 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
168 This will be applied in Part V.
169 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872).
170 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 318 (1917). The Court has also characterized the
temporary interference of the enjoyment of property as compensable by a Fifth Amendment
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the Court of Federal Claims found that the interference was severe, de-
priving the beneficial use from the Commission.171 The land was trans-
formed by the government flooding from being suitable for a forest and
wildlife preserve to a headwater swamp.172 From these cases, a rule can
be established for grounds for the substantiality of an interference in a
takings case, that the government is liable for flooding interferences with
the usefulness or enjoyment of a land.
All four factors must be satisfied to constitute a successful takings
claim. Since takings are subject to permanent damage by temporary
floodings,173 civil damages can be determined through substantiality of
the destruction.174
V. RELEVANT APPLICATIONS: VIRGINIA, NEW ORLEANS, AND
NEW JERSEY
As omissions of the government which induce flooding fit into a
regulatory and theoretical framework, the Ridge Line test in accordance
with the Game & Fish Commission opinion has been adapted to create a
four-factor test for takings regarding government-caused flooding. In this
section, the four factors will be applied to three major and recent flooding
controversies: flooding in Fairfax, Virginia, flooding in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina, and the flooding of the Jersey Shore after Hurricane
Sandy. In these cases, the government failed to take proper precautions
against recurrent flooding and storm surges, which were likely intensi-
fied by global warming and sea level rise.
A. Flooding in Fairfax, Virginia
In 2006, a severe storm hit Northern Virginia, causing a local
stream’s flow depth to rise from two to nearly fourteen feet.175 A combina-
tion of the Beltway and sediment accumulation in the flood channel
blocked the flood waters from dispersing, and instead, the water rushed
taking. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259, 266–67 (1946) (Overhead flights
from a nearby airport interfered with the owner’s customary use of his property as a
chicken farm).
171 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 644, 647 (2009).
172 Id. at 610.
173 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012).
174 Causation, foreseeability, and responsibility would also be factors in accounting for
punitive damages, which occur in tort situations.
175 Livingston v. Va. Dep’t. of Transp., 726 S.E. 2d 264, 267 (Va. 2012); DOTY & OLCOTT,
supra note 8, at 3.
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into the neighborhood of Huntington in Fairfax, Virginia.176 The flood
waters mixed with sewage, and flooded the property of 135 owners and
renters.177 The property owners brought suit against Fairfax County and
the Virginia Department of Transportation (“VDOT”), arguing that the
flood was a state constitutional taking.178
The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the government’s failure
to properly design a flooding control structure created standing for a
takings claim.179 The damage caused by the flooding in this case, through
“affirmative and purposeful” acts, required compensation.180
While the Livingston case only sets the groundwork for consti-
tutional standing for takings in Virginia flooding cases,181 the decision
greatly reflects the four-factor test set out above.182 The opinion simpli-
fied causation to damage caused by a public use.183 While this is a different
version of the causation factor I argued for,184 it is applicable in practical
matters of far-reaching importance, such as the flooding that occurred in
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.185
The court noted the following regarding foreseeability in the
Livingston case:
The storm that led to the June 2006 flood was no doubt
severe, but it was not unprecedented—Hurricane Agnes in
1972 produced a greater water flow in the relocated
Cameron Run. That the channel would at times be subjected
to heavy water flows, then, was not unforeseeable. More
importantly, however, the Plaintiffs allege that the June
2006 flood was the result not of natural causes but of
human agency: Had VDOT not allowed several feet of
sediment to accumulate in the relocated Cameron Run,
they claim, “the vast majority of [their] homes would not
have been flooded at all, and those few that did would
have suffered only minor flooding.”186
176 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 267; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 3.
177 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 267; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 3.
178 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 267; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 3–4.
179 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 272; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 4.
180 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 274; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 5.
181 See DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 5.
182 See supra Part IV.
183 See Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 278.
184 Action and proximate cause would be satisfied.
185 See infra Part V.B.
186 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 271–72.
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This is on point with the foreseeability requirement of the four-factor test.
Once the government recognizes, or should reasonably recognize an inade-
quate flooding concern, the government should take measures to account
for future floods. While the government body may not have an affirma-
tive duty to protect property against damage, they will be encouraged to
protect property against flooding to avoid a successful takings claim.187
The court was explicit in displaying the responsibility factor, stating
that the government’s failure to act is a compensable damage under the
Virginia Constitution as long as the government’s conduct is “affirmative
and purposeful.”188 This reasoning amounts to an omission.189
For the substantiality factor, the court did not seem to require
substantial damage for a taking, rather, it established a compensable
taking for a flooding that occurred only once.190 It also seems that the
amount or severity of damage is not at issue as long as the property is
physically damaged.191 Doty and Olcott keenly note that residents affected
by a flooding, “may be awarded a variable amount of compensation or none
at all.”192
The framework provided by Livingston v. Virginia Department of
Transportation is rarely found in other states.193
B. Flooding in New Orleans: Hurricane Katrina and the
Levee Failure
A notable example of the failure of a government flood mitigation
effort occurred in 2005. In late September, Hurricane Katrina made
landfall near New Orleans as a Category Four hurricane.194 Levees and
pump systems in the city—meant as a last line of defense to protect the
city from flooding—were breached by the increased height of the flood
187 DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 6.
188 Livingston,726 S.E. 2d at 274; DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 4–5.
189 See DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 4–5.
190 Livingston, 726 S.E. 2d at 271.
191 See id. at 273–74.
192 DOTY & OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 6.
193 Arkansas has a rule that is stronger than the rule outlined in Livingston. See Robinson
v. City of Ashdown, 783 S.W. 2d 53 (Ark. 1990) (requiring the government to pay an
aggrieved landowner when the government failed to properly design or maintain a public
work). Other states have failed to follow the lead of Virginia and Arkansas. DOTY &
OLCOTT, supra note 8, at 5.
194 Jonathan Corum & Ben Werschkul, Draining New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, http://www
.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/2005_HURRICANEKATRINA_GRAPHIC/index
_02.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3YB4-7WUF.
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waters caused by the storm.195 The levee failures flooded 80 percent of
the city, with flood depths from one to ten feet.196 Nine hundred eighty-six
Louisiana residents died as a result of the storm.197 The floods displaced
more than 600,000 households, one month after the storm.198 In New
Orleans, 70 percent of housing units, or 134,000 units, were damaged.199
The estimated cost of damage in New Orleans from the flooding may be
as much as $250 billion.200
The Army Corps of Engineers is frequently cited as being responsi-
ble for the flooding of portions of the Lower 9th Ward and St. Bernard Par-
ish because of its failure to maintain the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet.201
Over 400 suits were brought against the government Army Corps.202
The suits were brought through tort causes of action.203 The cases
were consolidated in Robinson v. United States, or In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litigation.204 The decision was trumped by the conclusion that
the government is immune to tort liability in flooding.205 This immunity is
established by the Flood Control Act of 1928 (“FCA”).206 The statute states
that, “No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.”207
While the Fifth Circuit initially said otherwise, upon second review, the
195 Id.
196 Allison Plyer, Facts for Features: Hurricane Katrina Impact, GREATER NEW ORLEANS
CMTY. DATA CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.gnocdc.org/Factsforfeatures/Hurricane
KatrinaImpact/, archived at http://perma.cc/A29C-9MZC.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Kimberly Amadeo, How Much Did Hurricane Katrina Damage the U.S. Economy?,
ABOUT.COM, http://useconomy.about.com/od/grossdomesticproduct/f/katrina_damage.htm
(last updated Aug. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/93GP-7NW3.
201 Mark Schleifstein, Hurricane Katrina Flooding in Lower 9th Ward, St. Bernard Parish
Heading to Court, NOLA.COM (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:11 AM), http://impact.nola.com/katrina
/print.html?entry=/2012/09/hurricane_katrina_flooding_in.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/8J4R-GZ8L.
202 See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 2012).
203 Id. See also 2012 Emerging Issues 6608, Hurricane Katrina Litigation, Hurricane
Katrina Litigation Against The United States: The Fifth Circuit Closes A Briefly-Opened
Window For Recovery, MATTHEW BENDER & CO., Dec. 20, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 Emerging
Issues 6608].
204 See generally In re Katrina 696 F.3d 436.
205 Id. at 441, 448.
206 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012).
207 Id. State and local jurisdictions may not have this same statutory protection.
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court affirmed the plaintiffs’ appeals, barring them from recovering from
the federal government.208
However, this provision applies only to the Mississippi River and
its flood control activity,209 and only to tort liability, as it cannot overstep
a constitutional taking.210
We can characterize the flooding caused by levee system failure
as a temporary taking as opposed to a tort. By applying the four-factor
test, it is easy to establish that the flooding was caused by the govern-
ment, the government was responsible for the flooding by improper or
incomplete action, and the damage caused was substantial. The issue in
the Katrina flooding litigation as a takings case would be determined by
whether the Army Corps had sufficient knowledge of the inadequacy of
the levees to know that substantial flooding would occur given intense
conditions, as in Hurricane Katrina, to rise to be considered foreseeable
flooding. There is evidence supporting both foreseeable211 and unforesee-
able212 arguments.
C. Flooding at the Jersey Shore: Hurricane Sandy and the Sand
Dunes Dispute
Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Atlantic City, New Jersey,
on October 29, 2012.213 In New Jersey, twelve people died as a result of
the storm, millions of homes did not have electricity for days, and billions
of dollars in property damage occurred.214 A full moon amplified the
storm surge, which rose to tides of nearly nine feet—almost twice that of
208 In re Katrina, 696 F.3d at 441. See also 2012 Emerging Issues 6608, supra note 203.
209 33 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
210 See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479, 1500 (2006)
(outlining the hierarchy of authorities in the United States, including the subordinate
position held by Federal statutes to the Constitution).
211 See, e.g., Joby Warrick & Peter Whoriskey, Army Corps Is Faulted on New Orleans
Levees, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2006/03/24/AR2006032401819.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7DF-D2J5.
212 See, e.g., Robert G. Bea, Failure of the New Orleans 17th Street Canal Levee & Floodwall
During Hurricane Katrina, GEOCONGRESS 08 (2008), http://www.urbanflood.eu/Docu
ments/Failure%20of%20the%20New%20Orleans%2017th%20street%20canal%20levee
%20and%20floodwall.pdf.
213 Tim Sharp, Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm, LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 27,
2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/9LWN-4BLR.
214 Id.
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most historic surges.215 Massive damage from the storm surge occurred
on the Jersey Shore, with many communities still struggling to recover a
year later.216
In response to the disaster, the federal government, in conjunction
with New Jersey, sought to upgrade—and in some areas, build—a sand
dune system that has been proven to protect towns on the Jersey Shore
in Sandy and prior storms.217 Opponents to the dunes brought suit in
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.218 The plaintiffs argued that the
detriment received from the construction of the dune (to both the prop-
erty and the lack of view) entitled them to just compensation as a govern-
ment taking.219 This was undisputed.220 However, the plaintiffs contended
that the general benefit of the protection the dunes give to the public did
not detract compensation from the just compensation calculation.221 The
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that:
[W]hen a public project requires the partial taking of
property, “just compensation” to the owner must be based
on a consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable,
and non-conjectural factors that either decrease or in-
crease the value of the remaining property. In a partial-
takings case, homeowners are entitled to the fair market
value of their loss, not to a windfall, not to a pay out that
disregards the home’s enhanced value resulting from a
public project. To calculate that loss, we must look to the
215 Id.; Bob Henson, Dissecting Sandy’s Surge, ATMOSNEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www2
.ucar.edu/atmosnews/opinion/8585/dissecting-sandys-surge, archived at http://perma.cc
/86W5-4D8D.
216 Scott Gurian, The List: Ten NJ Communities Still Struggling to Recover from Sandy,
NJSPOTLIGHT (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/12/08/the-list-ten-nj
-communities-still-struggling-to-recover-from-sandy/, archived at http://perma.cc/E2GZ
-XNLN (All ten communities cited are coastal municipalities).
217 Kate Zernike, Trying to Shame Dune Holdouts at Jersey Shore, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/nyregion/dunes-fight-sets-neighbor-against-neighbor
-in-new-jersey.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print, archived at http://perma
.cc/ND4C-47ZR. But see Joanna M. Foster, Can Artificial Sand Dunes Save the Jersey
Shore?, CLIMATEPROGRESS (Nov. 1, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013
/11/01/2855451/jersey-beach-battles/, archived at http://perma.cc/9RME-8HFX.
218 See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013).
219 Id. at 526.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 534.
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difference between the fair market value of the property
before the partial taking and after the taking.222
Soon after the settlement of the case, Governor Chris Christie signed an
Executive Order directing the New Jersey Attorney General to “immedi-
ately coordinate legal action to acquire the necessary easements to build
dunes.”223 Many towns have maintained a strong effort to persuade
property owners to permit the government to obtain easements to build
the dunes.224
Although the New Jersey dunes project has been met with favor
from the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Governor, we can imagine a
New Jersey where this was not the case. We can imagine a coastal munici-
pality, X-Town, unrestricted by law, that may disregard the science of sea
level rise,225 and the disastrous effects from Sandy. All along the Jersey
Shore, every other town has permitted the federal government to con-
struct the dune system. X-Town refuses to settle. Many years in the future,
conditions of flood mitigation protection in X-Town remain unchanged
from the present. During this time, Sandy II hits, as powerful and with as
much destructive force as Sandy I in 2012. X-Town receives massive
amounts of damage from the flood waters, while the rest of the Jersey
Shore municipalities remain minimally damaged—the dunes serving
their purpose.
Under the four-factor test, we can determine whether a taking
occurred by omission of X-Town in constructing the dunes for its resi-
dents. The government caused the damage as it consciously omitted
building dunes, causing substantial and foreseeable damage. The local
government of X-Town would be responsible for compensating the residents
222 Id. at 526–27. After the court’s decision, the Karans settled the dispute for $1. Martin
Bricketto, NJ Pushes Dune Construction As Landmark Case Settles, LAW360, (Sept. 25,
2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/475651/nj-pushes-dune-construction-as
-landmark-case-settles, archived at http://perma.cc/BZ7X-TKLQ.
223 Press Release, State of New Jersey, Governor Christie Signs Executive Order To Move
Forward With Dune Construction And Other Flood Hazard Risk Reduction Measures
(Sept. 25, 2013) (on file with author), available at http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news
/news/552013/approved/20130925b.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3PPW-QT6N; Exec.
Order No. 140, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Sept. 25, 2013),
available at http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eocc140.pdf.
224 See Evan Lehmann, One Year After Sandy, N.J. Towns Accelerate Dune Building,
Despite Holdouts, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059989390, archived at http://perma.cc/4BGF-2SLQ.
225 See supra accompanying text at notes 9–18.
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of X-Town (likely all of them in some way) for the damage to their prop-
erty by way of taking liability.
CONCLUSION
This Note argued that Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States permits more than the plain ruling that property damage
caused by temporary or intermittent floodings is compensable as a constitu-
tional taking. The language of the ruling permits omissions or failures of
the government regarding flood mitigation works to be considered takings.
Since the Supreme Court ruled that the flooding created a takings claim
as opposed to a tort claim, and the property in question was protected by
a liability rule as opposed to a property rule, a regulatory framework can
be created. Precedent from the Ridge Line case suggests that a revised test
is applicable to consider omissions or failures to act by the government.
The four-factor test was applied to three scenarios to prove its relevancy.
This Note, while surveying many different issues and concerns,
fails to discuss some relevant matters. This Note focuses on the rights of
the landowners, and does not cover other matters of justice, alluded to by
Calabresi and Melamed, concerning the rights of the government or rights
of other property owners and the public. This Note does not focus on a
deep legal analysis on all precedent the Supreme Court considered, or
could consider, with regard to the Game & Fish Commission decision.226
This Note merely reflects the tip of the iceberg on the practicalities and
possibilities opened by the Supreme Court’s ruling, how it is consistent
with other legal theories, and how it is practical in the world.
With the realities and dangers of recurring flooding and impend-
ing sea level rise in the present and all-too-near future, the Game & Fish
Commission decision may provide an extreme benefit for the public, as
coastal jurisdictions will be encouraged to protect citizens from intermit-
tent recurrent floodings and provide better maintenance in flood mitiga-
tion projects. To avoid takings claims, jurisdictions should be incentivized
to provide protection to citizens in order not to litigate or settle with count-
less individual property owners who sue for a temporary taking for recur-
rent flooding. Jurisdictions can save money by protecting their citizens
226 For a relevant discussion tangential to this Note on the legal distinction of “temporary”
and “permanent” takings in precedent cases, see Brian T. Hodges, Will Arkansas Game
& Fish Commission v. United States Provide a Permanent Fix for Temporary Takings?,
41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 365 (2014).
456 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:427
from harm, rather than paying for inevitable, severe, and widespread
damage from natural disasters and sea level rise.
As damage and destruction from sea level rise is becoming more and
more frequent,227 litigation should return to the Supreme Court within
the next few years. The merits of this paper and the protection of prop-
erty owners will have the spotlight in the most distinguished court in the
United States. For the safety of coastal residents throughout the United
States, let us hope the property owners prevail.
227 Erika Spanger-Siegfried, Sea Level Rise and Tidal Flooding: Forthcoming Report on
Encroaching Tides Signals a New Chapter for Many Coastal Communities, THE EQUATION
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://blog.ucsusa.org/sea-level-rise-and-tidal-flooding-encroaching-tides
-signal-a-new-chapter-for-many-coastal-communities-673, archived at http://perma.cc
/F9JF-SMGK.
